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subject matter is within the jurisdiction, it is not, as to it, a court of
limited jurisdiction. 2' As another Ohio case held,2" the probate courts
have full power to adjudicate fully and finally all questions arising in
matters properly before them.
Therefore, it would seem that in the principal case the appellate
court should not have permitted the collateral attack on the judgment
of the probate court in regard to the will of 1927, but rather should
have denied such an attack, leaving the plaintiff to his right to bring
a direct proceeding attacking the judgment. The fact that the statute
of limitations has run on such a direct proceeding,23 leaving the plaintiff
without a remedy, does not justify the rendering of an erroneous decision
in sustaining the present attack on the admission to probate of this later
dated will. S.D.G.
INTENT TO EXECUTE AN INSTRUMENT INCOMPLETE
ON ITS FACE
The Probate Court of Montgomery County recently rendered a
decision admitting to probate as a valid will an instrument in which the
residuary devise terminated with an incomplete sentence. The name of
the devisee had not been inserted in the blank left by the testator for that
purpose. The remainder of the will appointed an executor but made no
other dispositions. The court found that the instrument was executed
anmo testandi and admitted it to probate, in the face of the contention
that since it was incomplete on its face, the testatrix must not have
regarded the instrument to be the final embodiment of her intent, but
had contemplated some further act to complete it. The only evidence
outside of the instrument itself in regard to the testatrix's intent was that
she had called the two subscribing witnesses to her home and stated to
them that she had made out her will and had requested them to act as
witnesses.'
There are several classes of cases similar to the principal one in which
the court must decide whether or not the instrument before it reflects
the final testamentary intent of the deceased. Such classes include cases
in which a partially executed will is formally executed in regard to
personalty, but not complete in regard to devising realty; cases in which
the testator has become physically incapacitated before completing the
will, in jurisdictions which do not require signing; cases in which a
"Brown v. Reed, 56 Ohio St. 264, 46 N.E. 98z (1897).
22 Wilberding v. Miller, go Ohio St. 46, io6 N.E. 665 (1914).
'Omio G.C. sec. 11640.
'In re Crowe, x7 Ohio Op. 8, 31 Ohio L. Abs. 35 (1940).
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bequest is void for ambiguity; and cases in which by parol evidence it is
proven that the testator considered some further act necessary in order
to execute his wll. The question in all of these is: does the instrument
in its unfinished condition represent the decedent's last wish as to the
disposal of his property or would he have preferred it to pass by intestacy
rather than by the unfinished instrument?
The courts of Maryland2 and Maine' have admitted to probate
testamentary instruments similar to the one in the principal case. Two
earlier Maryland cases,4 a New York,' and a Pennsylvania decision'
have held such instruments invalid. In several jurisdictions it was former-
ly the rule that an unsigned, unattested instrument could be validly used
for a testamentary disposition of property. What then of those instru-
ments terminated in the middle by the testator's sudden death or
physical incapacity? Is the instrument in its partially completed form
the expression of decedent's last intent? A Tennessee court' has stated
the view of those courts upholding the validity of such instruments.
"If a testator gives one or more legacies by his will and is prevented from
completing said will by his death, sudden sickness, or insanity, and if it
appears from the evidence that the testator had expressed his full purpose
and intent with regard to the legacies given, the will may be set up as far
as it goes, but if it appears, either from the face of the will or other proof,
that he had not expressed his full mind and intent with regard to the
legacies given, the will can't be set up as far as it goes."' Where it was
evident that the testator intended that certain technicalities or some
further act, other than the filling in of blanks, should be done before
the will is completed, the courts have refused to accept conformance to
lesser requirements.' In many cases in which the testator has failed to
fill in a blank, the courts have held the will valid but the specific bequest
void and of no effect, no question having arisen in regard to the animus
testandi of the entire will.10
In determining the validity of deeds containing blanks the courts
have stated without qualification that there must be a grantee named or
" Harris v. Pue, 39 Md. 535 (1873).
'1n re Goodridge, 119 Me. 371, ix Atl. 4z5 (1920).
"Plater v. Groome, 3 Md. 134. (I852)5 Barnes v. Syester, 14. Md. 507 (1859).
'In re Pierson's Will, 197 N.Y.S. 312, 203 App. Div. 673 (x9zz).
'Murry v. Murry, 6 Watts (Pa.) 353 (IS 37 ).
'Guthrie v. Owen, zx Tenn. (z Humphr.) zoz (1841).
'All courts have not been in agreement on this interpretation. Tabler v. Tabler,
6z Md. 6oi (x8 4 ); Montefiore v. Monteflore, x6z Repr. 324, 2 Addams 354 (1824.).
'Mealing v. Pace, 14 Ga. 596 (I853)i Lungren v. Swartzwelder, 44 Md. 482
(IS 7 6); Selden v. Coalter, 2 Va. Cas. 553 (SIS).
'Everett v. Carr, 59 Me. 3Z5 (1871)i Bryan v. Bigelow, 77 Conn. 604, 6o Atl.
266 (I9o5 ;) Hawman v. Thomas, 44 Md. 30 (1875); Heidenheimer v. Bauman, 84 Tex.
174, 19 S.W. 35Z (I892), Engelthaler v. Engelthaler, x6 UL. z3o, 63 N.E. 669 (z9oz).
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the deed is void" and that the instrument must describe specific prop-
erty.' 2 In negotiable instruments the courts recognize validity and an
implied power in the holder to fill all blanks.13 Other written contracts
in which essential matters have been left in blank have been held
invalid,'" although sometimes there is found an authority to fill in the
blanks in accordance with the general character of the instrument.'" In
none of these cases does the court mention the intent of the party
executing the instruments. It appears that the rules applicable to deeds
and contracts other than negotiable instruments are contrary to the
grantor's intent, in the sense that the grantor or contracting party
usually intends the instrument to be valid as executed. To him the
identity of the grantee or second party to the contract is of little con-
sequence. His main interest is the consideration received. In the case
of negotiable instruments, the decision probably represents an attempt
to protect the holder in due course, regardless of the promissor's intent.
In contrast to these rules of substantive law, the courts have resorted to
evidence of intent in determining the validity of wills containing blank
spaces. If from the face of the instrument and from other evidence, it
appears to the court that the instrument was executed with a testamentary
intent, it is so interpreted; if the instrument and evidence indicate a
contrary intent, the court will refuse to admit it to probate."0
It is evident, then, that two classifications are possible in regard to the
four types of instruments, according to the admissibility of extrinsic evi-
dence, (I) of intent as to validity, and (2) of authority to complete the
instrument. Under the former classification deeds, negotiable instru-
ments and other contracts constitute a group in which such evidence is
excluded, whereas wills are a group in themselves wherein it is admis-
'Williams v. Courton, 17z Ark. 329, 287 S.W. 74S (39z6); Donnelly v. Duma-
nowski, 329 Ill. 482, 16o N.E. 759 (1928); Aetna Casualty Co. v. Commonwealth, 233
Ky. 142, 25 S.W. (2nd) 5 (1930)i Nash v. Kirschoff, z66 Minn. 464, zo8 N.W. 193
(19z6).
'Jones v. Coulter, 75 Cal. App. 540, 243 Pac. 487 (1925).
'Alford v. Delatte, x6o La. 712, 107 So. 5oo (1926); Cassetta v. Baima, xo6
Cal. App. 196, 288 Pac. 830 (1930)5 Adair v. First Nat. Bank, 253 II. App. 2o6
(1929); U.S. Nat. Bank of La Grande v. Miller, isS Ore. zSo, 246 Pac. 726 (1z6).
The party intrusted with the instrument has prima fade authority to complete it by flling
up the blanks therein. Sec. 14, NEC. INSTR. LAw, Omo, G.C., sec. Siig.
"Patterson v. Reid, 132 Cal. App. 454, 23 Pac. (znd) 35 (i933); House v. Sealey,
354 Miss. 663, xZ So. 741 (1929); Atkins v. Van Buren Tp. School, 77 Ind. 447
(s88s)j Pepper v. Harris, 73 N.C. 36S (1875).
'Jenkins Music Co. v. Johnson, 175 Mo. App. 355, z6z S.W. 308 (1914)i Johns-
ton Harv. v. McLean, 57 Wis. z58, iS N.W. 177 (883).
" In view of the fact that the proponent of the will need only establish a prima
face case in Ohio in order to get the will admitted to probate, and since in this matter a
prima facie case requires only that amount of evidence which, if it had been tried before
a jury, might have resulted either for or against it, z Ohio St. L.J. 292, it is unlikely
that the proponent will find difficulty in proving testimentary intent.
IIO
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sible. Under the latter classification, contracts, both negotiable and
otherwise, are a class in which the power to complete is found-in fact
is sometimes presumed-whereas wills and deeds constitute a group
wherein the opposite is true. Moreover, in the case of wills, it should
be noted, such a power would have been terminated by death even had
it originally existed. In the principal case the court has resorted to the
first classification.
H.M.M.
